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ABSTRACT
Reactive jamming nodes are the nodes of the network that
get compromised and become the source of jamming attacks.
They assume to know any shared secrets and protocols used
in the networks. Thus, they can jam very eectively and
are very stealthy. We propose a novel approach to identify-
ing the reactive jamming nodes in wireless LAN (WLAN).
We rely on the half-duplex nature of nodes: they cannot
transmit and receive at the same time. Thus, if a compro-
mised node jams a packet, it cannot guess the content of
the jammed packet. More importantly, if an honest node
receives a jammed packet, it can prove that it cannot be
the one jamming the packet by showing the content of the
packet. Such proofs of jammed packets are called \alibis" -
the key concept of our approach.
In this paper, we present an alibi framework to deal with
reactive jamming nodes in WLAN. We propose a concept of
alibi-safe topologies on which our proposed identication al-
gorithms are proved to correctly identify the attackers. We
further propose a realistic protocol to implement the iden-
tication algorithm. The protocol includes a BBC-based
timing channel for information exchange under the jamming
situation and a similarity hashing technique to reduce the
storage and network overhead. The framework is evaluated
in a realistic TOSSIM simulation where the simulation char-
acteristics and parameters are based on real traces on our
small-scale MICAz test-bed. The results show that in rea-
sonable dense networks, the alibi framework can accurately
identify both non-colluding and colluding reactive jamming
nodes. Therefore, the alibi approach is a very promising
approach to deal with reactive jamming nodes.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communications are inherently vulnerable to jam-
ming attacks due to the open and shared nature of wireless
medium. In the jamming attack, an attacker injects a high
level of noise into the wireless system which signicantly re-
duces the signal to noise and interference ratio (SINR) and
reducing probability of successful message receptions.
There are two types of jamming strategies in wireless net-
works [31]: proactive and reactive jamming strategies. In
proactive jamming strategies, attackers jam channels regard-
less of whether there are on-going communication activities
on the channels. Typical examples of proactive jamming
strategy are continuous jamming, periodic jamming and ran-
dom jamming strategy. The active jamming strategies are
easy to implement but they are not energy ecient. More
importantly, they can be defended relatively easier than re-
active jamming attacks (see Section 6).
Reactive jamming attacks, in contrast, only jam the chan-
nels when there are on-going communication activities. Typ-
ical examples are scan-and-jam (on multi-channel networks)
and listen-and-jam strategy (on single-channel networks).
The diculty in defending against reactive jamming strat-
egy lies on attackers' ability to become stealthy. For exam-
ple, in a listen-and-jam strategy in a wireless LAN (WLAN),
an attacker looks for an preamble signal and immediately
sends a short packet to corrupt the body of the incoming
packet. To become stealthy, it may want to jam some (pos-
sibly important) packets and behave like other nodes for the
rest of the time. In this way, beside the fact that the attacker
can do signicant damage to the network, it also makes other
honest nodes to back o more frequent and can enjoy extra
throughput when behaving honestly. Thus, we refer to this
type of attacks as stealthy reactive jamming attacks.
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In this work, we consider the problem of identifying com-
promised nodes who launch stealthy reactive jamming at-
tacks in half-duplex single-channel wireless LAN. This is a
very challenging problem because the attackers are assumed
to know any shared secret and protocols in the network and
try to stay undetected as long as possible while maximiz-
ing the damage done to the network. To the best of our
knowledge, none of the existing work can deal with this
type of attackers in the context of WLAN (see Section 6)
briey due to two reasons. First, many approaches are only
concerned about how to build jamming-resistant communi-
cations [27][26][22][9][11] without identifying the source of
jamming. Jamming-resistant communications are necessary
but not sucient because as long as the jamming nodes are
not identied, they always have eective jamming attacks on
the network. Second, there are also several works on iden-
tifying mis-behaving nodes. However, because the attackers
leave no identity information in the jammed packets (e.g.
by corrupting the sender eld), detection systems relying on
identity clues to infer nodes causing the jammed packet do
not work (e.g. [24][12])
We propose a novel framework to this challenging prob-
lem. The framework relies on \alibi" concept and thus is
named as alibi framework. Alibi is\a form of defense whereby
a defendant attempts to prove that he or she was elsewhere
when the crime in question was committed". Because in a
half-duplex wireless network where nodes cannot send and
receive at the same time, attackers who jam will not be able
to receive the content of jammed packets. Therefore, any
nodes that can show proofs of corrupted packets are subject
to getting an alibi in that time slot. In the long term, nodes
who obtain least number of alibis are likely to get accused.
Figure 1 illustrates how each honest node gets alibis on jam-
ming events by node 5. In Figure 1(a), node 3's message is
jammed. Node 2 and 6 receive a corrupted packet. If they
both show the content corrupted packet, they can both claim
an alibi. Similarly, in Figure 1(b), when node 1's message
is jammed, node 2 and 4 will get an alibi by showing proofs
of receiving an corrupted packet. In this manner, at some
point each honest node in the network will get at least one
alibi while the jammer (node 5) will have no alibis. Until
then, the jammer can be identied.
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(a) Node 3's message is
jammed by node 5. Node
2, 6 get an alibi by show-
ing the content of the cor-
rupted packet.
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(b) Node 1's message is
jammed by node 5. Node
2, 4 gets an alibi by show-
ing the content of the cor-
rupted packet.
Figure 1: Example of Alibi Scheme.
Even though the concept of alibi framework may appear
simple, there are numerous challenges to make it work. First,
an attacker who jams in a time slot can always show a
random corrupted packet content as a proof of reception.
Therefore, the alibi system has to rely on the corrupted
packet content from several receivers to justify the trustwor-
thiness of the proofs of reception. Second, collided packets
are not dierent from jammed packets. That means, nodes
may get \false"alibis that are resulted from collisions. Thus,
there will certainly be some noises in the detection process
relying on number of alibis. Third, in an extreme situation
where attackers decide to jam any single packet, the alibi
system cannot operate on the main channel anymore. There-
fore, there has to be a jamming-resistant communication to
exchange alibi information in the network. The alibi frame-
work uses a BBC-based timing channel with no pre-shared
secret for nodes to communicate. Due to the low throughput
of the BBC-based timing channel where raw packet content
cannot be exchanged eciently. The alibi framework uses a
technique called \similarity hashing" to compress the packet
content such that their similarity are still preserved. Fourth,
there might be more than one attacker in the system. A
jamming action of one attacker may help other attackers to
obtain alibis. The situation is even worse when they can
coordinate/collude with each other. Lastly, attackers are
assumed to know any protocols used in the network. Thus,
they can do certain types of attacks on the alibi system such
as slander attacks.
We have designed and implemented the alibi framework
using both analysis, simulation and MICAz test-bed exper-
iments. Our major results and ndings can be summarized
as follows.
 We develop a novel alibi framework for the problem of
identifying reactive jamming attacks.
 We carry out experiments on a small MICAz test-bed
of 6 nodes to study the impact of reactive jamming at-
tacks on the network performance and the hypothesis
of reception similarity under reactive jamming attacks
(Section 3).
 Based on the results from the experiments, we propose
a concept of\alibi-safe"network topology where the al-
ibi framework can identify attackers and correspond-
ing alibi identication algorithms (Sections 2 and 4).
We also prove the correctness of the alibi identication
algorithms on alibi-safe topologies. To this end, we
study the connection between physical network topolo-
gies and alibi-safe topologies (Section 5.1). This con-
nection is very important in helping network designer
to deploy the wireless networks to defend against the
reactive jamming attacks.
 We design a practical alibi protocol including a BBC-
based timing channel (Section 4.4) and a similarity
hashing technique (Section 4.5) for more ecient proof
exchange under the reactive jamming attacks.
 We implement and evaluate the alibi framework on
a large-scale networks in TOSSIM simulator (Section
5). The implementation includes BBC-based timing
channel, similarity hashing and the identication algo-
rithms. We incorporate the small-scale MICAz exper-
imental results including the packet error rate trace,
the noise trace and the reception similarity trace into
TOSSIM for accurate simulation results.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, in
Section 2, we give the network model and attack model. In
Section 3, we study the impact of reactive jamming attacks
on the network performance and the reception similarity.
Then, we show the details of the alibi framework in Section
4 including the algorithms, the framework and basic build-
ing blocks such as BBC-based timing channel and similarity
hashing. We show the evaluation results of the alibi frame-
work in Section 5. We discuss the related work in Section 6.
Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 7.
2. SYSTEMMODEL
2.1 Network model
We consider a single-channel WLAN of n nodes. One
node is the trusted base station. Denote N as the set of
the nodes in the network (i.e, jN j = n). Each node in the
network is equipped with a half-duplex radio, i.e. it cannot
transmit and receive at the same time. Thus, there will be
non-negligible delay to switch from transmit mode to receive
mode and vice versa. We assume CRC-failed packets are
still delivered to the upper layer. We assume each node
uses CSMA/CA MAC. We also assume a central detection
model, i.e. nodes will send information to the base station.
2.2 Attack model
We assume some nodes in the network are the reactive
jamming attackers. Thus, the attackers also have same
physical capabilities as other nodes. The attackers, how-
ever, have the complete control of the MAC, physical pa-
rameters of the radio network interface. The attackers are
insider attackers. That means, they are assumed to know
any security-related information of the node such as security
keys. They also know any protocols used in the system.
The goal of the attackers is to remain undetected while
maximizing the number of jammed packets. The attack-
ers use probabilistic reactive jamming strategy. That means
whenever an attacker J senses an on-going packet by detect-
ing the presence of a preamble, it will transmit a jamming
packet with probability pJ . pJ is called the \reactive jam-
ming probability" and is dened for each sending packet.
This denition is dierent from traditional jamming rate in
the literature which is dened over each time slot regardless
of whether there is sending packet in that time slot. Hence-
forth, the term \jamming rate" refers to \reactive jamming
rate" unless explicitly specied.
3. IMPACT OF REACTIVE JAMMING AT-
TACKS
It might be noticed that in the example above we as-
sume received corrupted packets, caused by the same jam-
ming event, have the same content (e.g., nodes 2 and 6 in
Figure 1(a)). In practice, this might not be the case. Thus,
in this section, we will carry out several experiments on a
testbed of MICAz motes with CC2420 radio to answer fol-
lowing two questions: 1) what are the capabilities of reactive
jamming attacks? and 2) what is the similarity of corrupted
packet contents under reactive jamming attacks?.
3.1 Impact of reactive jamming attacks on net-
work performance
In our experiments, a reactive jamming attack is per-
formed on a set of 3 nodes as shown in Figure 2(a). Nodes
are placed such that they can hear each other at the strongest
power level (i.e. level 31, 0dbm). S and J are the sender and
jammer, respectively. R is the receiver who receives packets
from S; J . C acts as the experiment controller.
To produce a reactive jamming attack, C will broadcast
a message. Upon receiving the broadcast message from C,
S starts sending a message of 43 bytes including 32-byte
random payload and 11-byte MICAz header. J also starts
sending a message of 43 bytes, including 32-byte all-0 pay-
load and 11-byte MICAz header, but with a delay  > 0.
 is chosen such that the jamming packet will arrive at the
receiver after the preamble of the sender. This is just to
make sure we have a correct implementation of a reactive
jammer. In our experiments,  is between 150s and 200s.
Note that we disable the clear channel assessment (CCA)
and backo mechanism of S and J to ensure concurrent
transmissions and CRC check mechanism of R. R records
any messages right after the broadcast message from C. The
recorded messages are then time-stamped and sent back to
C for trace collection. For condent statistics, each experi-
ment is repeated 200 times.
It is known that signal-to-interference-noise-ratio (SINR)
will decide the packet content. Theoretically, SINR =
PRS
PR
J
+PN
where PRS and P
R
J are the received powers of the
signal sent from S and J at the receiver R; PN is the noise
power. PS and PJ can be calculated as P
R
S = PS  dSR 
and PRS = PSdJR  where PS ; PJ are the sending powers
of S;R; dSR; dJR are the distance from S; J to R; and  is
the path loss factor. Therefore, the major factors aecting
SINR are the distance between S ! R; J ! R and the send-
ing powers of S; J . Thus, in our experiments, we vary the
distance between S ! R; J ! R and the sending powers of
S; J . We put 6 MICAz motes in the line as shown in Figure
2(b). In a reactive jamming attack scenario, we have one
sender at mote i (i = 1::6) with the sending power level k
(k = 1::30), one jammer at mote j (j 6= i; j = 1::6) with
the sending power level l (l = 1::30) and 4 receivers at re-
maining nodes. We try all possible combinations of (i; j) in
6 positions where j > i. For each (i; j) pair, we will perform
following experiments.
 We measure the received signal strength indication
(RSSI) from the sender to each receiver R, denoted
as RSSISR(dSR; PS), without any sending of the jam-
mer.
 Similarly, we also measure the RSSI from the jammer
to each receiver R, denoted as RSSIJR(dJR; PJ), with-
out any sending of the sender.
 We collect corrupted packets at each receiver under re-
active jamming attacks (i.e., both sender and jammer
sending) for reception similarity calculation.
Figure 3(a) shows the RSSI at a receiver 1ft away from the
sender and the receiver at dierent sending power levels,
i.e. RSSISR(1ft; PS) and RSSIJR(1ft; PJ). The x-axis is
sending power level of the sender and the jammer (PS ; PJ).
The y-axis is the RSSI in dbm.
Figure 3(b) shows the packet error rate under reactive
jamming attacks. The x-axis, denoted by \RSSI by sender"
(i.e. RSSISR), is the RSSI of the signal from the sender to
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(a) Reac-
tive jamming
attack cong-
uration
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(b) Topology of 6 nodes
Figure 2: Reactive jamming experiment settings
the receiver. Note that the RSSI metric takes into account of
both the sending power and the distance between the sender
and the receiver. Similarly, the y-axis, denoted by \RSSI by
jammer" (i.e. RSSIJR), is the RSSI of the signal from the
jammer to the receiver. A pair of RSSI from the sender and
the jammer characterizes a receiver. The z-axis shows the
packet error rate of each receiver.
From the graph, we have the following observations.
 IfRSSISR(dSR; PS) >> RSSIJR(dJR; PJ), the packet
error rate decreases sharply to 0. This region is re-
ferred to as the\white" region. Receivers in this region
are called white receivers.
 IfRSSISR(dSR; PS) << RSSIJR(dJR; PJ), the packet
error rate increases sharply to 1. This region is referred
to as the \black" region. Receivers in this region are
called black receivers.
 WhenRSSISR(dSR; PS) andRSSIJR(dJR; PJ) are close
(< 5dbm dierence), the packet error rate is between
0 and 1. This region is referred to as the \grey" region.
Receivers in this region are called grey receivers.
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Figure 3: Results on reactive jamming experiments
3.2 Reception similarity under reactive jam-
ming attacks
We want to see the similarity of received packet content
of any pair of receivers under reactive jamming attacks. We
treat a packet content as a binary string. The similarity of
two packet contents is dened as the similarity of the two
corresponding binary strings. The similarity of two binary
strings B1; B2 of length l is dened as
sim(B1; B2) = 1  H(B1; B2)
l
(1)
where H(B1; B2) is the Hamming distance of B1 and B2 de-
ned as the number of positions at which the corresponding
bits of B1 and B2 are dierent. The similarity has a range
of [0; 1]. Similarity of 0 means two packet contents are com-
pletely dierent. Similarity of 1 means two packet contents
are identical.
We correlate all received packet content of each pair of
receivers. Thus, we have a reception similarity table whose
lines are tuples of (RSSISR1 ; RSSIJR1 ; RSSISR2 ; RSSIJR2 ; C).
The pairs (RSSISR1 ; RSSIJR1) and (RSSISR2 ; RSSIJR2)
characterize the rst and the second receiver, respectively.
C is the average of similarity of received packet content of R1
and R2. Note that in our experiments, the lowest similarity
is 0:5, statistically. This is because the content of the send-
ing packet is uniformly generated, i.e. each bit is uniformly
generated between 0 and 1. After constructing the reception
similarity table, we have the following observations.
 For a white receiver (i.e. successful reception), it will
have very strong reception similarity (close to 1) with
other white receivers. This is obvious because nodes
in the white region have successful packet reception.
It has a wide range of weak reception similarity with
grey receivers (range of [0:55; 0:95]). This can be ex-
plained as the grey receivers still have some correct
bits from the sender's content. However, a white re-
ceiver has very weak reception similarity with black
receivers (range of less than 0:55). Figure 4(a) shows
the reception similarity of a typical white receiver R
(RSSISR =  50dbm, RSSIJR =  64dbm) with all
other receivers.
 Similarly, for a black receiver (i.e. unsuccessful recep-
tion), it has a very strong reception similarity with
other black receivers, a wide range of weak reception
similarity with grey receivers and very weak recep-
tion similarity with white receivers. Figure 4(b) shows
the reception similarity of a typical black receiver R
(RSSISR =  59dbm, RSSIJR =  54dbm) with all
other receivers.
 For a grey receiver, it has a strong reception similarity
(range of [0:6; 0:8]) with other grey receivers in the grey
region. It has wide range of a week reception similarity
with black and white receivers. Figure 4(c) shows the
reception similarity of a grey receiver R (RSSISR =
 59dbm, RSSIJR =  61dbm) with all other receivers.
From this experimental study, we can conclude that the
reception similarity of received packet content under
reactive jamming attacks has the locality property.
That means, receivers closer in the RSSI plane have stronger
reception similaritys of packet contents. This is very impor-
tant for the design of alibi framework as shown in Section
4.
4. ALIBI FRAMEWORK
4.1 Definitions and notations
Denote S(t) as the set of transmitters at time slot t. De-
note PS!r(t) as the packet content received by the receiver
r under the concurrent sending of senders in S(t). Denote
PRS!r(t) (S  Nnr) the proof of reception for a receiver r
at time slot t.
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Figure 4: Experiment results on the reception similarity (z-axis: darker colors represents higher values)
Definition 1 (Alibi of reception (AR)). An alibi of
reception for two receivers r and q at time slot t under the
set of sender S is dened as
ARS!r;q(t) = sim(PRS!r(t); PRS!q(t))
where sim is the reception similarity function dened in
Equation 1.
Definition 2 (-alibi neighbors). Two nodes r and
q are called -alibi neighbors (0    1) under a set of
senders S in the time slot set T = t1; t2; ::; tjT j if
E[ARS!r;q(T )] = 1jT j
X
8t2T
ARS!r;q(t)  
The denition above involves the average of reception sim-
ilarity of two receivers over a set of time slots. This is be-
cause we do not know the exact distribution of the reception
similarity of any two receivers1. Thus, our analysis will rely
only on the average and deviation of the reception similarity
derived from the experiments described in Section 3.
Definition 3 (-jammer). A jammer is called -alibi-
jammer (  0:5) if it can guess correctly the outcome of the
packet from a sender s 2 N caused by its jamming actions
with probability .
Based on our experiments, which is also conrmed in [25],
it is very hard to guess the content of the jammed packet.
Thus, the best the jammer can do is a random guess which
results in  = 0:5.
Definition 4 (Complete alibi-safe topology). A
wireless network topology is called a (; )-alibi-safe topology
if for all pairs of sender s 2 N and jammer j 2 N , every
node r 2 Nnfs; jg has at least  -alibi neighbors.
The denition above is strict because it requires that for
any possible locations of the jammer and the sender, any
receiver always has at least  -neighbors. This guarantees
that any honest node is always alibi-safe regardless of where
the attackers may be. However, if we know some nodes in the
network that can be trusted, we can have a looser denition.
1In fact, to the best of our knowledge, there is no theoretical
model capturing the distribution of the reception similarity
under concurrent transmissions.
For example, in our WLAN setting, the base station can be
trusted. Thus, we only need to make sure that every node
has at least  -neighbors under the sending messages from
the base station jammed by any possible jammer.
Definition 5 (Alibi-safe topology with trusted senders).
A wireless network topology is called a (; ;)-alibi-safe
topology under a set of trusted senders   N if for all
pairs of sender s 2  and jammer j 2 Nn, every receiver
r 2 Nnfj;g has at least  -alibi neighbors.
4.2 Alibi identification algorithms
4.2.1 Identifying non-colluding attackers
Algorithm: The basic identication algorithm relies on the
fact that a jammer can only do a correct guess with proba-
bility  on the content of the packet it jams. That means,
whenever it jams a packet, it only has  reception similar-
ity while the other nodes get at least  reception similarity
(statistically). Let us dene an alibi score function ascore
for a node r in a time slot set T as follows
ascorer (T ) =
X
t2T
r (t)
where r (t) =

1 if maxq2Nnr ARS!r;q(t)  
0 otherwise
r (t) is the alibi indicator function for r at time t. It
indicates whether at time slot t, a node r has an reception
similarity greater than  with some node. Thus, the neces-
sary condition to identify a jammer j is
ascorer (T ) > ascorej (T ); 8r 2 Nnj (2)
. In other words, a node is accused if it has lowest alibi
score.
Claim 1 (Identifying non-colluding attackers).
In (; )-alibi-safe topology (  1) with ka -jammers J =
j1; ::jka with jamming rate pj1 ; :::pjka , the alibi scheme can
identify any attacker jJ if
pmaxs  2  1  pj
pagg(J )
where pagg(J ) = 1  Qkai=1(1   pji) is the aggregated jam-
ming rate of the jammer set J and pmaxs is the maximum of
sending probabilities of the honest nodes.
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Proof : See Appendix.
It is easy to see that the above identication algorithm also
works for alibi-safe topologies with trusted senders. Instead
of considering packet sending events from any senders, we
only consider the packet sending events from the trusted
senders.
4.2.2 Identifying colluding attackers
Definition 6 (Colluding attackers). Colluding at-
tackers are those who have pre-shared knowledge among them-
selves.
Note that the denition above allows the attackers to col-
lude through a pre-shared knowledge only. It does not con-
sider the case where attackers can share new knowledge dur-
ing the network operations (e.g. their proofs of reception).
However, collusion via pre-shared knowledge is a very strong
attacker model as follows. First, with pre-shared knowledge,
colluding attackers can agree on a content of \fake" proofs
sent to the detector. In this way, an attacker who jams is
still able to get reception similarity with the other attack-
ers. This collusion will help the jammers to escape from the
above alibi identication algorithm. In a bigger picture, with
pre-shared knowledge, the attackers can arbitrarily manip-
ulate the reception similarity among themselves. However,
they cannot manipulate the reception similarity with other
honest nodes. Second, with pre-shared knowledge, collud-
ing attackers can coordinate who jams which slot. That
means, any two attackers will never jam at the same time
slot. In this way, the jammers never waste their jamming
eort. Third and last, it is possible to perform a coordinated
jamming attack to create \real" proofs as follows. At a time
slot, rst jammer sends a packet. Second jammer jams the
packet of the rst sender. Thus, the rest of jammers and
honest nodes can all get real proofs and real reception simi-
larity among each other. Even though the rst two jammers
might not get any reception similarity2, they can get com-
pensated later when other jammers take turn. Apparently,
this type of coordinated jamming attack can break any al-
ibi identication algorithms in complete alibi-safe topologies
where no senders can be trusted. Thus, we are now going
to present an identication algorithm to identify colluding
attackers in alibi-safe topologies with trusted senders. Note
that in WLAN, the set of trusted nodes could be the base
station alone.
Algorithm: The basic strategy to deal with colluding at-
tackers is to exploit their only weakness: they cannot manip-
ulate the reception similarity with other honest nodes under
the jammed packets from the trusted senders S 2 . Thus,
we dene the alibi indicator function for a node r as follows.
~r (t) =

1 if q 2 r(N ); ARS!r;q(t)  
0 otherwise
where r(N ) is the list of nodes in N decreasingly sorted
by the similarity with r at time t and Qk is the k-th element
in r(N ). Once again, the alibi score is dened as
~ascorer (T ) =
X
t2T
~r (t)
2In fact, they may be able to get reception similarity because
both the content of sending packet and jamming packet are
known.
. Similar to the case of non-colluding attackers, an attacker
j is identied if
~ascorer (T ) > ~ascorej (T ); 8r 2 Nnj
Claim 2 (Identifying colluding attackers). In a
(; ;)-alibi network topology ( > 1) with ka -alibi col-
luding jammers J = j1; ::; jka with jamming rate pj1 ; ::; pjka
and the total jamming target pT =
P
i2J pi, the alibi scheme
can identify at least one attacker if pmaxs <
pT
ka
.
Proof : See Appendix.
4.3 Alibi protocol
The identication algorithm in Section 4.2 requires the
proofs to be present at the detector. That means, every
node in the network has to participate in the detection algo-
rithm. Nodes that do not report proofs are at risk of being
accused as attackers and received appropriate reaction from
the system such as their removals.
Jamming detection: Because sending proofs incurs over-
head to nodes, the base station only collects proofs when
there is a jamming attack. To detect the presence of jam-
ming attacks, we use a similar detection techniques proposed
in [31]. For the uplink trac (i.e. from nodes to the base
station), a jamming attack is declared if the base station re-
ceives a signicant number of corrupted packets with strong
received signal strength. For the unicast downlink trac,
the base station declares the presence of jamming attacks
after getting a signicant number of sending packets with-
out receiving acknowledgements.
 Step 1: Once the base station detects a jamming at-
tack, it starts a proof-collection period of Tcollect in
which it starts to broadcast \test" packets at random
intervals. The content of the test packets are uniformly
drawn from the message space, i.e. each bit in the
content is uniformly drawn from f0; 1g. The uniform
randomness ensures that the attacker can only have a
blind guess on the content. Note that each honest node
always maintains proofs in the latest window interval
of Tcollect. At the end of the proof-collection period,
the base station broadcasts a proof-exchange message.
 Step 2: When nodes receive the proof-exchange mes-
sage from the base station, they immediately start
sending the proofs that they have just collected in the
last Tcollect time interval to the base station.
 Step 3: After receiving proofs from nodes collected in
the last Tcollect time interval, the base station starts
the identication algorithm based on the set of time
slots in which it sent \test" packets. It removes any
identied attackers. After that if there is still jamming
attack going on, it repeats Step 1.
All messages between nodes and the base station are trans-
mitted using BBC-based timing channel. The BBC-based
timing communication relies on the timing pattern of send-
ing packets to convey the actual message. It has a strong
resistance to reactive jamming attacks and allows concurrent
transmissions of multiple senders. One major disadvantage
of this timing channel is its low throughput. More details
are discussed in Section 4.4.
6
To cope with the low throughput nature of the BBC-based
jamming-resistant timing-channel on which proofs are ex-
changed, the alibi framework compresses the proofs using a
hashing technique called \similarity preserving hashing" (or
locality sensitive hashing). Unlike other hashing techniques
such as MD5 or SHA-1, similarity hash functions have a
special property that the Hamming distance of hash val-
ues of two objects is proportional to their original Hamming
distance. Therefore, instead of storing and exchanging the
raw packet content, each node only needs to keep the hash
version of proofs to reduce the storage and communication
overhead. Section 4.5 will give more details.
4.4 BBC-based timing channel
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Figure 5: An example of BBC broadcast using pulses
(excerpted from [9]).
BBC is a keyless jamming-resistant broadcast communi-
cation proposed in [9]. The basic idea is to have the sender
create\indelible"marks in an additive-OR channel to convey
a sending message. The receiver receives a \packet" contain-
ing all the marks and decodes the original sending message.
Indelible marks in the additive-OR channel have an impor-
tant property: the jammers cannot erase the existence of
the marks in the channel; they can only create extra marks.
Therefore, a received BBC packet may contain more marks
than those created by the senders. In other words, the set
of marks in the received BBC packet is the super-set of the
marks created by senders. Thus, the coding scheme is called
concurrent code and BBC code is the only known implemen-
tation of the concurrent code.
A message M of length n bits is encoded into a mes-
sage M 0 of length m = ne, where e is the expansion fac-
tor (e > 1). Denote (m; i) to be the rst i bits of mes-
sage m and a hash function H (e.g. MD5 or SHA1). For
each i 2 (1; n), we calculate the location L(i) of the i-th
mark corresponding to bit i as L(i) = H((m; i)) mod m.
Therefore, the message M is encoded into n marks whose
locations are from 0::m. The encoded message M 0 will then
be transmitted in m slots. The marked slots correspond to
transmissions of a pulse (i.e. a preamble-only packet). The
unmarked slot is equivalent to no transmission. Figure 5
shows an example of a BBC encode and broadcast using
pulses. Message M = 1011 is padded with two 0-bits and
becomes M = 101100. An indelible mark is a radio pulse,
and its location is the time when pulse occurs relative to
the start of the message. The table on the right shows part
of the denition of the hash function H(x). Each prex of
the padded message is hashed using the hash function H(x).
The results of the hash are used as the locations of the pulse.
There are several ways to create an additive-OR channel
[9]. In the alibi framework, we build a pulse-based chan-
nel from the data channel. A pulse is 4-byte preamble-only
packet. Multiple pulses sent at the same time results in
only one single pulse. In this way, this pulse-based channel
is an additive-OR channel. For BBC code, a pulse is also
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Figure 6: Decode tree for the BBC broadcast using
pulses (excerpted from [9]).
an indelible mark. Reactive jammers cannot erase marks
because they jam only after sensing the preambles3. In ad-
dition, concurrent sending of multiple marks will result in
only one mark. Therefore, the BBC-based timing channel
built in this way is not only robust to the reactive jammers
but also allows multiple concurrent message transmissions.
It is important to emphasize that there is a critical thresh-
old on the number of concurrent transmissions below which
all concurrent transmission are highly successful and above
which no concurrent transmission are successful. This criti-
cal threshold implies a trade-o between the maximum num-
ber of successful concurrent transmissions and the transmis-
sion length of the messages. Specically, to have n nodes
sending a message of b bits concurrently with high successful
rate, the transmission length has to be O(nb). Figure 7(a)
shows the performance of the BBC-based timing channel in
which the maximum number of concurrent transmissions is
targeted at 10. As shown in the Figure 7(a), there is a sharp
decrease of the successful transmission probability (y-axis)
from 0:95 to 0:2 when the number of concurrent transmission
(x-axis) approaches 10 and goes beyond. Figure 7(b) further
shows the transmission length (y-axis) versus the targeted
maximum number of concurrent transmissions (x-axis).
It is also important to emphasize that the proof trans-
mission using BBC in Step 2 of the alibi protocol is not
encrypted. If in Step 2, a jammer decides to listen for some
proofs, which takes a signicant time, and start the proof
transmission to the BS, the start of its proof transmission
period will be signicantly late compared to any other nodes
and can easily be detected by the BS.
4.5 Similarity Hashing (SimHash) & Alibi
Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) is a popular technique
used in information retrieval to detect near-duplicate docu-
ments [6]. Essentially, LSH is a method of performing prob-
abilistic dimension reduction of high-dimensional data. The
basic idea is to hash high-dimension input objects so that
similar objects are mapped into the same buckets with high
probability. In other words, input objects are hashed such
that their similarities are preserved in the hash space. This
similarity-preserving property is completely opposite to nor-
mal hashing techniques (e.g., SHA1, MD5), where a small
dierence of inputs might lead to a completely dierent hash
3In fact, even if the attackers jam the preambles, it is still
possible to detect the jammed preambles. However, the
preamble detection has to rely on the energy detection rather
than the preamble signature.
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outputs. Formally, a locality sensitive hashing scheme is a
distribution on a family F operating on a collection of ob-
jects, such that for two objects x; y, Prh2F [h(x) = h(y)] =
similarity(x; y), where similarity(x; y) 2 [0; 1] is the sim-
ilarity function dened on the collection of objects. In the
alibi framework, a similarity hashing function h 2 F is used
to hash the packet content. That means, the reception sim-
ilarity of two packet content B1; B2 will be calculated as
sim(B1; B2) = 1  h(B1);h(B2)l .
While there are several techniques to implement F [6][10][3][8],
we choose the random projection technique, also referred
to as simhash, proposed by Charikar [6] due to its sim-
ple and ecient implementation [18]. The random projec-
tion method of the similarity preserving hashing is designed
to approximate the cosine distance between vectors. The
basic idea of this technique is to choose a random hyper-
plane (dened by a normal unit vector ~r) at the outset
and use the hyperplane to hash input vectors. Formally,
we let h(~v) = sgn(~v  ~r), i.e., h(~v) = 1 depending on
which side of the hyperplane ~v lies. Therefore, each pos-
sible choice of r results in a binary output. If we choose
the vector ~r t times uniformly, we will have a t-bit output
of vector ~v. For any two vectors ~u;~v, the bits of two t-bit
outputs match with probability proportional to the cosine
of the angle between them. In [6], the author proves that
Pr[hr(~u) = hr(~v)] = 1   (~u;~v) , where  is the angle of
vectors ~u and ~v.
The point of using simhash is to reduce the amount of
data needed for storing and transmitting proofs. For exam-
ple, a 32-byte packet content can be sim-hashed into a 2-byte
ngerprint while still preserving reasonable accuracy of the
similarity with other packet content. Figure 8 shows the ac-
curacy of 2-byte sim-hash for a 32-byte vector. Two 32-byte
vectors sampled uniformly are sim-hashed. The plot shows
the similarity of original 32-byte vectors (i.e., X-axis) and
the similarity of the 2-byte sim-hash values (i.e., Y-axis).
4.6 Outlier detection algorithms
Due to the probabilistic nature of the alibi score dened
in Section 4.2, we need a statistical detection algorithm to
detect outliers in the set of alibi scores calculated for nodes.
Specically, given a set of ascoreR(T );8R 2 N in the time
slot set T , we need to identify the set of nodes with the alibi
scores that are too low compared to other nodes.
Because we do not know the distribution of the alibi scores,
the outlier detection algorithm has to be non-parametric.
Therefore, there will certainly be the tradeo between the
false alarm probability and correct detection probability. In
the alibi framework, we use a distance-based outlier detec-
tion technique as follows.
Denote ;  the mean and standard deviation of ascoreR(T ),
respectively. A node R is determined as outlier if its dis-
tance to the \center" (i.e. ) is larger than a pre-determined
threshold . We use the Mahalanobis squared distance cal-
culated asD(R) = (ascoreR )2 1. Mahalanobis squared
distance D(i) is used rather than Euclidian distance because
Mahalanobis distance takes into account the deviation of the
alibi scores and does not depend on the absolute value of the
alibi score. Specically, Mahalanobis distance has a prop-
erty that the probability of D(i) > 2() is  where 2() is
the upper (100)-th percentile of a chi-square distribution.
A node R is accused as an attacker if D(R) <  and
D(R)  . The rst condition ensures that we only accuse
nodes that have alibi scores lower than the mean . The
second condition species the threshold  in which R is ac-
cused based on its distance D(R). Intuitively, lower value of
 increases the detection probability (i.e. accusing R when
R is an attacker) but also increases the false alarm probabil-
ity (i.e. accusing R when R is an honest node). In the alibi
framework,  is chosen based on the target false alarm prob-
ability . Specically,  = 2(). For example, if the target
false alarm probability  is 0:1,  is set to 2(0:1) = 2:706.
5. EVALUATION
5.1 Evaluation of alibi-safe topologies
There is a strong connection between alibi-safe topologies
and physical topologies. Thus, it is important to determine
whether a given physical topology is an alibi-safe topology.
Because alibi-safe topology only relies on the received sig-
nal strength, we need to assume a propagation model in
order to calculate RSSI from the sending power. In the fol-
lowing, we assume a log-normal shadowing path-loss model
(see Appendix). To test whether a given physical topology
is an (; )-alibi-safe topology under a set of senders , we
perform following steps. First, for each sender S in , we
calculate the RSSI at each receiver for the message sent by
S. We use the reception similarity table constructed in the
experiments described in Section 3 to determine whether
two receivers are -neighbor. Then, for each receiver, we
count the number of -neighbors. If any receiver has less
than  -neighbors under the sender S, the topology is not
(; )-alibi-safe topology.
We perform the alibi-safe test for three types of physical
topology in a 20m20m square: star topology, grid topology
and random topology where the set  only has the trusted
base station located at the center of the square. Figure 9
shows the results of the alibi-safe tests for the network size
from 10 to 100. The x-axis is the  value and the y-axis
is the minimum number of -neighbors for every node (i.e
). That means, each point represents a possible (; )-
alibi-safe topology. For star topology where nodes surround
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Figure 9: Physical topologies vs. Alibi-safe topologies
the base station, there is high chance for a node to have
alibi neighbors as shown in Figure 9(a). For grid topology,
it is less alibi-safe as shown in Figure 9(b) because nodes
have dierent distance to the base station. The alibi-safe
of random topologies really depends on network density as
shown in Figure 9(c).
In terms of robustness to colluding attackers, star topolo-
gies are the strongest. In a star topology, each node has
roughly 30% of other nodes as its 0:55-neighbors. For grid
topologies and random topologies, these numbers are around
15% and 7%, respectively.
5.2 Evaluation of alibi on TOSSIM simulator
We use TOSSIM as our network simulator for a large-
scale evaluation of the alibi framework. TOSSIM does not
assume any radio propagation model; instead, it provides a
radio abstraction between two-node communication. Specif-
ically, it derives the packet error rate based on the empirical
RSSI. Furthermore, it also has a more accurate noise gen-
erator using Close Pattern Matching (CPM) algorithm on
a given noise traces. In our simulation, the noise trace is
the one obtained from the experiments described in Section
3. Because TOSSIM does not provide the reception similar-
ity of packet contents under reactive jamming attacks, we
add that feature at the physical layer using the reception
similarity table obtained from the experiments in Section
3. BBC-based timing channel is implemented at the MAC
layer in TOSSIM and is transparent to the application layer.
There are two alibi protocols: the Omniscient protocol
(OMS) and the Alibi-BBC-Simhash protocol (ABS). The Om-
niscient protocol is the optimal protocol because it assumes
every proof is available immediately at the central detector
right after its creation. The ABS protocol uses the BBC-
based timing channel and simhash.
We evaluate the two alibi protocols under three types of
topologies: star topology, grid topology and random topol-
ogy in a square of 20m  20m and two types of attackers:
non-colluding and colluding attackers. We vary the simula-
tion parameters as shown in Table 1. We obtain the detec-
tion accuracy (i.e., the detection probability and the false
alarm rate), the detection time, the network performance
and the network overhead. However, due to the space limit,
we only show the results for the star topology.
Detection accuracy: Figure 10 shows the detection ac-
curacy of the ABS protocol under non-colluding jamming
attacks and colluding jamming attacks. Specically, Fig-
ures 10(a) and 10(b) show the detection accuracy for non-
colluding attackers using the same jamming rate of 0:2. It is
shown that as the number of attackers increases, the detec-
tion probability decreases. This is because when the network
has more attackers, the chance for an attacker to get alibis by
the jamming actions of the other attackers also increase. It
is shown that as the network size increases from 10 to 40, the
detection probability increases. This is because the larger
network size increases the number of -neighbors and makes
the attackers busier to jam. The gures also show that the
false alarm rate remains similar under dierent network sizes
and number of attackers. This shows the expected behavior
of the proposed outlier detection technique. We also obtain
the results for dierent  but do not plot them here. Essen-
tially, larger value of  will lead to lower false alarms but also
lower detection probability. Figures 10(c) and 10(d) show
the detection accuracy for colluding attackers who collude
and coordinate to target at 100% jamming rate. The trends
are similar to the case of the non-colluding case. However,
the detection probability is slightly worse compared to the
non-colluding cases. This is due to the fact that 1) collud-
ing jammers need to jam less than non-colluding jammers
for the same aggregated jamming target and 2) each node
needs more -neighbors than the non-colluding case.
Figure 11 shows the detection performance of ABS pro-
tocol against the OMS protocol for n = 40. ABS protocol
has a gap of around 0:2  0:3 to the OMS protocol. This is
because the nodes cannot send all the proofs to the central
detector due to the low throughput of the timing channel.
Packet error rate: Figure 12 shows the packet error rate
of the non-colluding and colluding attackers. As shown in
Figure 12, with the same jamming rate of 0:2, having more
non-colluding attackers only increases the packet error rate
sub-linearly. In contrast, colluding attackers can coordinate
to achieve 100% jamming. This shows the danger of collud-
ing attackers over the non-colluding attackers.
Detection Time: Figure 13 shows the detection time for
the case of non-colluding and colluding attackers. As shown
in the gures, as the number of jammer increases, it takes
longer time to identify them. The explanation is similar to
the detection probability.
6. RELATEDWORK
There has been plethora body of research work on jam-
ming attacks and defenses. Jamming attacks can be classi-
ed as proactive or reactive. In the proactive jamming strat-
egy, the attacker jams the channel without caring about the
on-going communication. A typical example of this type
is the continuous jamming [30][28]. This strategy is the
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Figure 11: Detection Accuracy: ABS vs. OMS (n=40)
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Figure 12: Packer error rate of the ABS protocol
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Figure 13: Detection time of ABS protocol
simplest way to perform a jamming attack. However, it
is not energy-ecient due to the continuous jamming activ-
ity which also makes the attacker easy to detect. Reactive
jamming strategy [2][19][13][17][15][20][4][12][28][23][21], in
contrast, avoids these drawbacks by intelligently listening
and jamming the channel. Thus, reactive jamming attacks
are more dicult to detect and are more energy-ecient.
Due to the dangers of various jamming attacks, jamming
defenses have gained much attention from researchers. Spread
spectrum techniques have been the most eective jamming
defense mechanisms. Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS),
Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS), and Chirp
Spread Spectrum (CSS) are three common forms of spread
spectrum techniques. By using the spread spectrum tech-
nique, the network can force the jammer to spend several-
fold more power than if spread spectrum were not used
[29][21]. However, spread spectrum does not work if the
jammer knows the hopping-pattern (HP) of the FHSS, the
pseudo-noise chip (PN) sequence of DSSS or the pulse-pattern
of CSS (Chirp Spread Spectrum) and UWB (Ultra-wide
band). Once the attacker knows such knowledge, he can jam
the channel very eectively. For example, the PN of 802.11
DSSS is a common knowledge [1]. By just using the COTS
802.11 cards, the attacker can easily modify the rmware to
have an eective 802.11 jammer [28]. Therefore, there is a
strong motivation to avoid using one single shared secret.
One approach is to use multiple shared secrets rather just
one single shared secret. In [5][7][14], the common idea is
to divide nodes into multiple groups and assign one unique
shared secret to each group. The assigned shared secret
of a group is used to derive the hopping-pattern for that
group to the base station. If the communication of a group
is jammed, one of a group member must be a jammer be-
cause no nodes outside the group knows the shared secret.
By further splitting the jammed group into sub-groups with
dierent shared secrets, the network can avoid mitigate the
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jamming eect caused by the compromised shared secrets.
Another approach is to remove the dependencies on the
pre-shared secret of traditional spread spectrum technolo-
gies. Recently, researchers have been proposing spread spec-
trum communication without any pre-shared secrets. Unco-
ordinated Frequency Hopping (UFH) [26][27][11] allows two
nodes that do not any common secret to establish a secret
key for future FHSS communication. Uncoordinated Direct
Sequence Spread Spectrum (UDSSS) [22] avoids jamming
by randomly selecting a spread code sequence from a pool
of code sequences. However, UDSSS is vulnerable to reac-
tive jamming attacks. RD-DSSS [16] also proposes a similar
technique that can be resistant to reactive jamming attacks.
BBC [9] proposes a coding approach to encode data to be
transmitted into\indelible"marks that can be decoded with-
out any prior knowledge of keys. The main drawback of
this approach is the low communication throughput (com-
pared to other classic spread spectrum techniques). There-
fore, such zero-shared-secret spread spectrum should only be
used to facilitate the process of delivering new shared secret
for the network.
Even though spread spectrum techniques have raised the
bar for jamming defense, they are not sucient to deal with
the situation where attackers are compromised nodes in the
network. In such a case, any attempts to deliver new shared
secrets are useless because the attackers are still inside the
network. Thus, it is necessary to rst identify compromised
nodes that launch jamming attacks to the network and then
deliver the new shared secrets to un-compromised nodes
only. Researchers have been looking into the problem of
identifying mis-behaving/compromised nodes. In [24][12],
the authors propose the detection schemes to identify mis-
behaving nodes that greedily consume the bandwidth by
modifying its MAC parameters. However, these detection
schemes will fail to detect stealthy reactive jamming attacks
considered in this paper because they rely on the identity-
related clues to infer the mis-behaving nodes.
Alibi framework is a complement to the above approaches.
It needs a jamming-resistant communication like BBC[9]. In
terms of detection, it collects the proofs showing good be-
haviors of nodes instead of collecting proofs of bad behaviors
of nodes[24][12].
7. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a design and implementation of the
alibi framework to deal with reactive jamming nodes. The
framework relies on the novel concept of \alibi" in which
the detector collects good proofs of nodes to infer the com-
promised nodes. We have shown a necessary condition, the
alibi-safe topology condition, to check whether a given net-
work topology is safe under reactive jamming nodes if the
alibi framework is used. This test can help to deploy the net-
work in a safe manner from reactive jamming nodes. It also
helps the network designer to decide whether to add more
trusted nodes into the network to make the network more
alibi-safe. We have also evaluated the framework in analy-
sis, simulation and test-bed experiments. The results show
that the alibi framework can deal with both non-colluding
and colluding attackers in reasonably dense networks.
Parameter Values
Number of nodes n = [10  50]
Number of attackers [1  9]
Jamming rate [0:1  1:0]
Value for -neighbors  = 0:55
 0.05
Simulation time 1000 seconds
BBC maximum number of concurrent transmissions 50
BBC message length in time 4s
Number of BBC messages per proof-exchange period 10
Number of bits for simhash 16 bits
Table 1: Simulation parameters
8. APPENDIX
8.1 Proofs
Proof of Claim 1: Consider a set of time slots T = t1; :::; tjT j
that have sending packets. For each time slot t 2 T , a
jammer j can increase its alibi point by 1 if it does not
jam and at least another jammer jams. This probability is
(1 pj)paggj . If j jams at time t, it is obvious that j = 0.
Thus, the overall alibi score of j is
ascorej (T ) = jT j  (1  pj) (1 
kaY
i=1;i6=j
(1  pji)):
Similarly, for the honest node r that has the highest send-
ing probability pmaxs , its accumulated alibi score is
ascorer (T ) = jT j  (1  pmaxs ) (1 
kaY
i=1
(1  pji)):
Substitute to the Inequality 2 and do some manipulations,
we have
pmaxs < 1 (1 pj)
(1 Qkai=1;i6=j(1  pji))
(1 Qkai=1(1  pji)) = 2  1  pjpagg(J ) :
.
Proof of Claim 2: With the denition of the alibi indicator
function, if a jammer j decides to make its reception simi-
larity with other (   1) jammers no less than , then the
-th reception similarity of j(N ) is a reception similarity
with an honest node. If j decides to make its reception simi-
larity with other 0 jammers (0 <  1) no less than , the
-th reception similarity of j(N ) is a reception similarity
with another jammer. However, the value of the reception
similarity is less than  and thus ~j = 0. Thus, regardless
of how a jammer manipulates its reception similarity with
other ( 1) jammers, its alibi score only increases by 1 if it
really has an reception similarity with an honest node that
is no less than . This will ensure that the collusion will not
bring any advantages for the attackers compared to other
honest nodes in terms of obtaining alibi scores.
Using a similar analysis in the Claim 1, it can be proved
that to satisfy Inequality 2, we need pmaxs < p
max
j where
pmaxj = maxi2J pji . Thus, if p
max
s <
pT
ka
 pmaxj , the alibi
scheme can identify at least one attacker. 
8.2 Log-normal shadowing path-loss model
In the log-normal shadowing path-loss model, PR = PS  
PL(d) where PL(d) = PL(d0) + 10pl log10
d
d0
+N is the
path-loss of the radio over a distance d; PR is the power of
the signal at the receiver; PS is the power of signal at the
sender; d0 is the reference distance and PL(d0) is the power
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decay for this distance; pl is the signal decay factor. N is
the zero-mean Gaussian (in db) with standard deviation 
representing the multi-path eects.
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